The Brookings Institute (another centrist think tank) has an article by Stephen J. Morse in their "Future of the Constitution" series that presents an interesting counter-argument to the statement that serves as the inspiration for the title of the blog. If scrolling down is to much trouble, allow me to remind you: “The difference between a crime of evil and a crime of illness is the difference between a sin and a symptom.”
Morse recounts the story of a man, Collera, who has a long history of violence and anti-social behavior. Collera is driving one day, and gets into one of those maddening situations where you're stuck behind a slow vehicle and can't pass. But instead of cursing and shaking his fist and maybe flipping off the guy in front of him, Collera commits vehicular manslaughter.
The article goes on to establish that Collera has a genetic profile that is associated with anti-social conduct when paired with severe abuse. The genes in question affect neuro-transmitter levels in a region in the brain that is associated with behavior regulation. And, it just so happens that Collera is indeed the victim of severe abuse.
Now, to be fair, Morse does state that Collera's evaluation results "make no mention of disease or disorder." But the point seems a minor one. Whether the brain abnormality is the result of genetic predipostion or damaged tissue (as in the case of TBI), the salient point is that the person's biology, their physiology, has an effect on their behavior.
Morse argues that, "Human beings are part of the physical universe and subject to the laws of that universe, but, as far as we know, we are the only creatures on earth capable of acting fully for reasons and self-consciously." He warns that, as our genetic and neurological-imaging knowledge and technology progresses, it may eventually undermine "all ordinary conceptions of responsibility and even the coherence of law itself."
His point is, essentially, that this knowledge undermines the idea of free will. And it does -- or it could. Implicitly, it seems like he's arguing that we shouldn't put too much stock in this technology, or this knowledge, because it goes against everything we've believed about ourselves up to now. I think that's the wrong response, though.
First of all, I disagree with Morse when he says we're capable of acting "fully for reasons and self-conciously." I think we all dearly want to believe that we're "rational human beings," but actually we're mostly "dumb animals," with a veneer of rationality on top. Much of the time, I think we use that rationality to explain our actions to ourselves after the fact, rather than actually acting rationally in the first place. This isn't a criticsm, so much as it's an observation.
Second of all, instead of ignoring the unpleasant fact that physiology has an impact on behavior, it seems to me that we're better served by using this knowledge as much as we can. Instead of waiting until someone has committed a crime and then squirming with the truth that it's actually not surprising given his history and physiology, shouldn't we instead try to figure out who is at high risk ahead of time, and give them tools to deal with their disability? Because, for all that it's invisible, and behavioral, surely a genetic or neurological pre-disposition to violence is as much a disability to be coped with as, say, diabetes. And we don't imprison people for that.
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